On Aquinas's Way to God
One of the issues that continually emerges in discussions of the existence of God is His status as a primary cause. God is often described as the first, primary, fundamental cause of things. Accordingly, in attempted demonstrations of God, if it can be established that there is a first cause, then we are somewhat on the way to God. Frequently then the focus of theistic arguments for God's existence will be on the nature of causality and establishing some first cause of all things.
A typical way of doing this is known as the Kalam argument. The general form of Kalam style arguments for God's existence is to show that whatever has a beginning of existence has a cause of existence, all created things have a beginning of existence, in which case there is a cause of all created things.
I allude to the Kalam argument above not to interrogate it; the Kalam argument has numerous defenders who will rigorously seek to justify every one of their claims and will indeed dispute the rough and ready presentation I have given it above. Rather, I advert to this style of argument in order to introduce it as a foil to Aquinas's way of establishing God's existence.
For Aquinas, the primary focus in arguing for God's existence is not the beginning or otherwise of a thing's existence. Indeed, Aquinas maintained that creation could be without a beginning and still require a cause. Rather, what Aquinas was interested in was the causal dependency in cause/effect relations. In considering such causal dependency Aquinas was motivated to distinguish between two kinds of causal series: (i) per acccidens and (ii) per se series.
In per accidens series, there are a series of causes and effects. Every effect depends on its immediately preceding cause for its presence in the series, but not for the causality of the series. The typical example Aquinas uses here is a series of fathers producing sons. A father (Peter) produces a son (James) who produces a son (John) who is Peter's grandson. Now the causality of the series is that of paternity, but in the series, James and John do not depend on their respective fathers in order to be able to bring about their own sons. The causal activity of paternity is not something that James and John have in virtue of depending on their fathers; rather it is a causality that they have in virtue of what they are. Hence, James does not need Peter's help in order to produce John. James can produce John simply in virtue of being a biologically functioning male.
Given all of this, it is not necessary in a per accidens series for earlier members of the series to be present to later members in order for the series to subsist. Peter can produce James, and having done so Peter can drop out of the series without impugning James's ability to produce John. James in turn can drop out of the series yet John can himself produce his own son, and so on. In per accidens series, the members of the series have the causality of the series in virtue of what they are, so each member is only dependent on its immediately succeeding cause for its presence in the series. So long as there is a cause for every member of such a series, there is nothing left to be explained. Hence it is possible for such series to be without a beginning (though it may in fact not be so).
On the other hand per se series are series of causes and effects in which the members of the series do not possess the causality of the series in virtue of what they are; rather they are dependent on some cause not only for their presence in the series but also for the causality they have whilst in the series. The typical example in this regard is the mind moves the hand to move the stick to move the stone (or the fire heats the pot which heats the contents of the pot). In this series, the hand-stick-stone do not possess the causality (motion) of the series in virtue of what they are. They accordingly depend on something for such causality. The mind in this case does happen to possess such causality in virtue of what it is and so it is able to impart motion to the members of the series. Hence, the hand-stick-stone have motion of themselves but such causal actuality is derived from and dependent on the causality of the mind. The mind then in this example is the primary cause not because it is first, but because it has the causality of the series in virtue of what it is, whereas the hand-stick-stone are secondary not because they come after the primary but because the are dependent on the primary for the causality in question.
In contrast to the per accidens series, per se series require a primary cause. This is because if we have a genuine per se causal series, then the secondary causes are unable to act as causes unless they participate in the causality of some primary cause. The hand-stick-stone would be immobile were it not for the mind moving them (similarly the pot and its contents would be unheated were it not for the fire). Take away the primary cause and the series ceases as a causal series.
The mind-hand-stick-stone series is pretty innocuous; whilst looking at the metaphysics apparent in such a series established the necessity for a primary cause in that kind of series, it does not get us to God. And this is correct, we are not immediately at God as a primary cause of all that is. The reason why we are not at God is because the mind is only primary cause of that particular series in which the causality is motion; it is not the primary cause in some other series, but secondary and subject to some other form of causality. Aquinas's insight was that if we can find some causal feature of things without which they would be nothing, a causal feature they do not possess in virtue of what they are, locate that in a per se series, then we can reasonably affirm that there is a primary cause for all that is.
Aquinas argued that this causal feature is the act of existence or esse. The act of existence is something that things have as distinct from what they are, i.e. essence and existence are distinct in things. Things then do not possess the causality of existence in the way that fathers and sons have the causality of paternity in the per accidens series above; rather things possess existence in the way that the hand-stick-stone have motion in the per se series. Hence, everything in which essence and existence are distinct is located in a per se causal series the causality of which is existence. Now given that such things do not have existence in virtue of what they are, they are dependent on and participate in some source of existence which is primary; this is because in the per se series the members depend on the primary for their causality. And recall that the primary cause in such series possesses the causality of the series in virtue of what it is. Hence things in which essence and existence are distinct depend for their existence on some primary cause which has the causality of existence in virtue of what it is. Were there to be no such cause of existence in essence/existence composites, there would be nothing; for such composites cannot pull themselves into existence by their bootstraps. Accordingly, there is a primary cause for the existence of all things and without it there would be nothing.
Aquinas reasons that this is what we understand God to be since with this argumentation we have established a primary cause without which there would be nothing. Aquinas goes on to establish a number of things about this primary cause, and we will deal with some of them in future posts. But for now I would like to finish by observing the nature of Aquinas's way to God.
I began by contrasting Aquinas's way with typical Kalam style arguments. As noted Aquinas is not concerned with what comes first or with the beginnings of things; rather he is concerned with the very existence of things. Hence he is not motivated to think back to the beginning of the universe, since he thinks that a beginningless yet created universe is plausible. Aquinas is after something much more radical, and that is the source of existence for all that is, whether in the past, now, or in the future. Such a source of existence cannot just be the source of existence for whatever is, but for whatever could be, since all existence comes from it. The focus for Thomas is not what was there in the beginning and kickstarted everything; rather it is the contrast between being and non-being, why is there something rather than nothing? This does not require us to go back to the beginning; it simply requires an analysis of anything that we come across and observation that such things do not exist in virtue of what they are, thence proceeds the reasoning of the per se series outlined above.
greetings,
ReplyDelete"In contrast to the per accidens series, per se series require a primary cause. This is because if we have a genuine per se causal series, then the secondary causes are unable to act as causes unless they participate in the causality of some primary cause."
it seems the justification here begs the question though for 'secondary cause' already includes the notion of primary cause, so that the claim 'a per series requires a primary cause because the secondary causes in it depend on such a cause ' really just says 'a per se series requires a primary cause because the causes in it that depend on it depend on such a case'.
"The hand-stick-stone would be immobile were it not for the mind moving them (similarly the pot and its contents would be unheated were it not for the fire). Take away the primary cause and the series ceases as a causal series."
the opponent can say though: "the stone would be immobile were it not for the mind moving it, and the same is true for the stick-stone (and so on for each cause-effect relation within such a series) - so why can't such a series extend infinitely?"
Because even in an infinite series, if nothing has the causal power by virtue of what it is, then nothing in the series will. As Dr. Feser has often said quoting the philosopher A.D. Sertillanges, “A paint brush can never paint by itself, even if it has an infinitely long handle”.
Deletethe opponent will say: 'nothing in the per series has causal power by virtue of what it is' in the following sense: for every member in that series, that member moves only in virtue of the immediately preceding member (e.g., were it not for the stick's motion, the stone wouldn't move, and were it not for the hand's motion, the stick wouldn't move, etc, etc.). so, if nothing in the series has causal power by virtue of what is (in this sense), then it's true that nothing in the series will i.e., nothing in that series will have causal power in this sense, such that it can move but not in virtue of the preceding member. so, it's still not shown why such a series can't be infinite.
DeleteA secondary cause is just a cause that does not possess essentially the causality in question; all this requires is recognition of that the causal property is not possessed by the cause in virtue of what it is, no presupposition of a primary cause here.
ReplyDelete'the opponent can say though: "the stone would be immobile were it not for the mind moving it, and the same is true for the stick-stone (and so on for each cause-effect relation within such a series) - so why can't such a series extend infinitely?"
Well that appears to misunderstand the nature of the series since in the series in question the hand-stick-stone does not possess the causality essentially, so whilst there are single cause effect relations, e.g. hand to stick and stick to stone, no such relations account for the causality of the series since none of those causes possess the causality essentially, in which case unless we come upon a cause which does cause the causality of the series (the mind or mental agent in this case) the causality remains uncaused. And such a cause will be one that does possess the causality essentially, otherwise it would be just another one of those things whose causality is caused in the series in question. Hence the need for a primary cause which does have the causality essentially (the mind or mental agent in this case).
'the opponent will say: 'nothing in the per series has causal power by virtue of what it is' in the following sense: for every member in that series, that member moves only in virtue of the immediately preceding member (e.g., were it not for the stick's motion, the stone wouldn't move, and were it not for the hand's motion, the stick wouldn't move, etc, etc.)'.
This misunderstands the nature of the series; for whilst it is indeed the case that that hand-stick-stone move, the motion that they have is not theirs, it is simply a derived or caused motion. hence, their causality is a caused causality, in which case the causal power that they have is not caused by any one of the immediately preceding members in which such causality is possessed non-essentially, since such a preceding member is in the same metaphysical state as its successor: both participate in and presuppose the causality in question, in which case neither cause the causality of the series.
Thank you for your response Dr. Kerr.
ReplyDelete“A secondary cause is just a cause that does not possess essentially the causality in question; all this requires is recognition of that the causal property is not possessed by the cause in virtue of what it is, no presupposition of a primary cause here.”
That’s good. There’s no need then, when characterizing a per se series and contrasting it to a per accidens series, to make reference to a primary cause.
“Well that appears to misunderstand the nature of the series since in the series in question the hand-stick-stone does not possess the causality essentially, […].”
The opponent accepts that neither the hand, nor the stick, nor the stone has causality essentiality (since he claims that nothing in the per se series possesses causality essentially). So, how does he misunderstand the nature of the series?
“[…] so whilst there are single cause effect relations, e.g. hand to stick and stick to stone, no such relations account for the causality of the series since none of those causes possess the causality essentially, […].”
The opponent though denies that the series itself has any causality. What has causality are only the members within it, all derivatively ad infinitum in the way specified before: the stone moves in virtue of the stick, the stick in virtue of the hand, the hand in virtue of the mind, the mind in virtue of … and so on. All together here and now. The series itself though is not the sort of thing that bears causal power. That, he’d claim, is a category mistake.
“This misunderstands the nature of the series; for whilst it is indeed the case that that hand-stick-stone move, the motion that they have is not theirs, it is simply a derived or caused motion.”
The opponent will say: ‘the motion is theirs, though it’s caused by another. If you mean: the motion is not theirs in an essential way - this is agreed on. but that’s consistent with it being really theirs (e.g., the kettle is actually hot i.e., it has heat as a real feature, despite the fact that it has it non-essentially).
“hence, their causality is a caused causality, in which case the causal power that they have is not caused by any one of the immediately preceding members […].”
The opponent denies this consequence: though it’s true that the stick moves the stone in virtue of being itself moved by the hand (and so on), there’s a genuine sense in which the stick does actually move the stone and so a genuine sense in which it has (derived) causal power. From this though it’s still not shown that this cannot go on infinitely.
Thank you for your replies and comments. Though it's been a while since you made your last reply, I hope that my reply can help in some way.
DeleteIt seems to me that for you, provided there is an infinite series of per se causes, you still think that there doesn't have to be a First Efficient Cause or a Cause that has the actuality by virtue of its Essence in order for that infinite series to have that feature or actuality. I think we can look at it in different ways.
We can simply think that an infinite series which has its actuality dependent on something else is a dependent series. So, an infinitely long stick is still a dependent stick, or you can think of infinite gears (or infinite sticks that hit one stick or another) as a dependent infinite series. Some may think that this commits the fallacy of composition. One example of this fallacy is that if the atom is light, it doesn't mean that all of the atoms of the elephant, when weighed together, will be light. An elephant is really a heavy animal. However, when we look at the example of the atoms, the more the atoms are, the heavier (or the less lighter) they become. But, I don't think that this is what we can see in a per se (or dependent series). If there is a stone that is hit by a stick, that is still dependent. When we add one stick that hits another stick for it to hit the stone, that is still a dependent series. No matter how much we add to it, it still remains dependent. I don't think that it becomes less dependent. As such, I think that an infinite dependent series is still a dependent series.
So, if it's a dependent series, it needs to depend on something else for its actuality. If it depends on "nothing", then it will not have the feature or the actuality that the series have. So, if there is "nothing" that has the motion in virtue of itself that moves the infinite number of sticks or gears or an infinitely long stick, well, it will not move.
Maybe, we can also look at it in a different way. Let's not start with the imagination that there is an infinite per se series that is already moving. Let's consider an infinite dependent series (I'll just be using the word dependent for per se or for essentially ordered series, but I do know that some philosophers may favor more technical terms like per se or essentially ordered series, etc) that doesn't move. Imagine that there is an infinite long stick that existed for eternity which is "not moving" or which is not in the state of motion. Will it suddenly move without any reason outside of it since its motion is derivative of something else or dependent on something else (on something that has the actuality of motion in virtue of itself or something intrinsic to it)? I think we may both agree that it will not move on its own. If you can imagine it moving without any cause, then that violates the principle of causality, even the newton's law of motion. At the same time, another possibility is that our imagination doesn't really perfectly capture reality just as the imagination that from absolute nothingness, then all of the sudden, there will be something that begins to exist. I think that's a contradiction. Of course, a theist can also say that there is nothing impossible with an infinitely long stick that is at rest for eternity, then suddenly moves, because God just caused it to move, at least in our hypothetical scenario.
Maybe, we can also look at it from another perspective. What if it's possible for an infinite stick (or infinite series) to be in the state of motion (without starting from rest) without any physical cause? When we go back to the laws of motion by Newton, he said that the object at rest will remain at rest unless something else moves it. Consequently, the object that is in motion will remain in motion unless something stops it (whether forces, friction, objects, etc). If this is the case, it can be the case that "remaining in motion" is part of the essence of the infinite stick that has been moving for eternity. And as such, if you think that this is possible, then the cause why the infinite stick or infinite series remains in state of motion is because of the essence of the infinite stick or its because it is in the state of motion in virtue of what it is. In this case, the example of an infinite stick that has been in constant motion doesn't really reject the principle of causality, including when it comes to infinite per se series. So, remaining in the state of motion is explained by the infinite stick itself. But, what explains the existence of the infinite stick?
DeleteI will just copy paste this existential argument for God by St. Thomas Aquinas from the work of Dr. Gaven Kerr on Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
"Thomas begins stage three with the premise that whatever belongs to a thing belongs to it either through its intrinsic principles, its essence, or from some extrinsic principle. A thing cannot be the cause of its own existence, for then it would have to precede itself in existence, which is absurd. Everything then whose essence is distinct from its existence must be caused to be by another. Now, what is caused to be by another is led back to what exists in itself (per se). There must be a cause then for the existence of things, and this because it is pure existence (esse tantum); otherwise an infinite regress of causes would ensue."
So, essence and existence is distinct in finite beings. The essence of the substance can be the cause of its other features. Let's say, my essence as a rational animal is the cause as to why I am capable of laughter. In my hypothetical case, to "remain in state of motion" is caused by the essence of the stick.
At the same time, the feature can also be caused by something outside of the thing or substance. For example, the light of the moon is dependent on the source of light, the Sun. Or, the infinite stick which started at rest but suddenly moved derived its motion from something else.
cause its existence which means that there is no existence. And, this is a contradiction. It also contradicts the principle that the cause is prior to the effect. In the Second Way of St. Thomas Aquinas, he said,
Delete"There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible."
So, it can't be the case that the existence of the stick is caused by the essence of the stick. So, its existence is caused by something outside of it. There can't be an infinite per se series, and as I've shown, the hypothetical example of the infinite stick does not really reject the idea of per se causes, so the infinite stick (or infinite series of stick) is caused by a Being whose Essence is Existence. God is Pure Existence, therefore God exists.
I am also thinking way before that in the real world, there is no actual infinite. For example, what causes my existence in such a way that if we take away the cause, I will no longer cease? For atheists or materialists, they may say that it's the concurrent actualization of my atoms with other principles that form me to be a human being. Well, I am not composed of infinite atoms and I am not an infinite series. You can't add something to an actually infinite series, and for sure, since I grow as a human being, I have more atoms compared to what I was before when I was a fetus or what. As such, even if an atheist can't accept the idea that an infinite per se series is impossible without a source that has that actuality in virtue of itself, just for the sake of argument, I don't think that the conclusion that "there is no Being whose Essence is Existence that causes my existence" is still wrong because I am not composed of infinite atoms, and I don't think there is even an "actually infinite per se causes" in the real world. Thomists may not argue in the way I just did here, but this is something I've been thinking as a "supplementary" argument for the Thomistic proof or for Existentialist argument for God.
Regarding an Infinite Per Se series, this blog post may help you from the Thomist philosopher Dr. Edward Feser.
https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/08/edwards-on-infinite-causal-series.html
Thank you and stay safe!
Apologies, I was unable to paste some of my sentences in my last reply prior to this, so I'll just paste it here so that it can be more clear. Thank you.
Delete* Since essence and existence is distinct with us, is existence a part of our essence? Or, does the essence of a man, a stick (or any other thing) cause its existence? Well, that will be a contradiction because that would mean that the essence of the stick (or any other object) will precede its existence. But, for the stick to cause its existence, it needs to exist. So, the stick exists before it exists at the same time. Or, if the essence precedes its existence, and the essence does not exist before its existence (we are referring to the cause being logically prior to the effect, not necessarily temporally prior), then the essence of the stick cannot cause its existence which means that there is no existence. And, this is a contradiction. It also contradicts the principle that the cause is prior to the effect. In the Second Way of St. Thomas Aquinas, he said,
"There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible."
So, it can't be the case that the existence of the stick is caused by the essence of the stick. So, its existence is caused by something outside of it. There can't be an infinite per se series, and as I've shown, the hypothetical example of the infinite stick does not really reject the idea of per se causes, so the infinite stick (or infinite series of stick) is caused by a Being whose Essence is Existence. God is Pure Existence, therefore God exists.
I am also thinking way before that in the real world, there is no actual infinite. For example, what causes my existence in such a way that if we take away the cause, I will no longer cease? For atheists or materialists, they may say that it's the concurrent actualization of my atoms with other principles that form me to be a human being. Well, I am not composed of infinite atoms and I am not an infinite series. You can't add something to an actually infinite series, and for sure, since I grow as a human being, I have more atoms compared to what I was before when I was a fetus or what. As such, even if an atheist can't accept the idea that an infinite per se series is impossible without a source that has that actuality in virtue of itself, just for the sake of argument, I don't think that the conclusion that "there is no Being whose Essence is Existence that causes my existence" is still wrong because I am not composed of infinite atoms, and I don't think there is even an "actually infinite per se causes" in the real world. Thomists may not argue in the way I just did here, but this is something I've been thinking as a "supplementary" argument for the Thomistic proof or for Existentialist argument for God.
Regarding an Infinite Per Se series, this blog post may help you from the Thomist philosopher Dr. Edward Feser.
https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/08/edwards-on-infinite-causal-series.html
Thank you and stay safe!
*
DeleteAs such, even if an atheist can't accept the idea that an infinite per se series is impossible without a source that has that actuality in virtue of itself, just for the sake of argument, I *think that the conclusion that "there is no Being whose Essence is Existence that causes my existence" is still wrong because I am not composed of infinite atoms, and I don't think there is even an "actually infinite per se causes" in the real world. Thomists may not argue in the way I just did here, but this is something I've been thinking just personally as a "supplementary" argument for the Thomistic proof or for Existentialist argument for God.